Contents of course reader

  1. Grice, Paul. “Meaning.” In Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 213–223.

  2. Searle, John R. “Meaning.” Ch. 6 of Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 160–179.

  3. Lewis, David. “Coordination and Convention.” Ch. 1 of Convention (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 5–16, 24–51.

  4. Grice, Paul. “Logic and Conversation.” In Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 22–40.

  5. Turing, A. M. “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” In Mind Design II: Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, ed. John Haugeland (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 29–56.

  6. Searle, John R. “Minds, Brains, and Programs.” In Mind Design II: Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, ed. John Haugeland (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 183–204.

  7. Block, Ned. “Psychologism and Behaviorism.” Philosophical Review 90 (1981), pp. 5–43.

  8. Putnam, Hilary. “Brains in a Vat.” Ch. 1 of Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1–21.

  9. Searle, John R. “Epilogue: Intentionality and the Brain.” Ch. 10 of Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 262- 272.

  10. Dennett, Daniel C. “True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works.” In Mind Design II: Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, ed. John Haugeland (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 57- 79.

  11. Putnam, Hilary. “Meaning and Reference.” Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973), pp. 699–711.

  12. Searle, John R. “Are Meanings in the Head?” Ch. 8 of Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 197–230.

  13. Burge, Tyler. “Individualism and the Mental.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (Studies in Metaphysics), ed. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), pp. 73–121.

  14. Quine, W. V. O. Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), sections 7–9, 11–13, 15–16, 45, pp. 26–40, 46–61, 68–79, 216–221.

  15. Quine, W. V. “Ontological Relativity.” In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 26–68.

  16. Quine, W. V. From “Reply to Chomsky.” In Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine, ed. Donald Davidson and Jaakko Hintikka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), pp. 302–4.

  17. Searle, John. “Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person.” Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987), pp. 123–146.

  18. Hookway, Christopher. “Translation and Explanation.” Ch. 9 of Quine: Language, Experience and Reality (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 146–63.

  19. Davidson, Donald. “Radical Interpretation.” In Inquires into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 125–139.

  20. Davidson, Donald. “Belief and the Basis of Meaning.” In Inquires into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 141–154.

  21. Davidson, Donald. “Rational Animals.” In Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 95–105.

  22. Davidson, Donald. “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs.” In The Philosophy of Language, 3rd ed., ed. A. P. Martinich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 465–475.

  23. Davidson, Donald. “Mental Events.” In Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 207–225.

  24. Davidson, Donald. “Knowing One’s Own Mind.” In Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 15–38.

  25. Dretske, Fred. “If You Can’t Make One, You Don’t Know How It Works.” In Perception, Knowledge, and Belief: Selected Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 208–226.

  26. Dretske, Fred. “Putting Information to Work.” In Perception, Knowledge, and Belief: Selected Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 195–207.

  27. Dretske, Fred. “The Nature of Thought.” In Perception, Knowledge, and Belief: Selected Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 227–241.

  28. Dennett, Daniel. “Evolution, Error, and Intentionality.” In The Intentional Stance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 287–321.

  29. Fodor, Jerry. “A Theory of Content, I: The Problem.” Ch. 3 of A Theory of Content and Other Essays (Cambridge: MIT University Press, 1990), pp. 51–87.

  30. Fodor, Jerry. “A Theory of Content, II: The Theory.” Ch. 4 of A Theory of Content and Other Essays (Cambridge: MIT University Press, 1990), pp. 89–136.

  31. Study Questions (compiled by John MacFarlane)

  32. Glossary (compiled by John MacFarlane)