square of opposition

Coursebook

Philosophy 142 – Philosophical Logic

  1. Leonard Linsky, “Two Concepts of Quantification,” Nous 6 (1972), 224-239.

  2. George Boolos, “To Be is to Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some Variables,” from Logic, Logic, and Logic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 54-72.

  3. W. V. Quine, “Three Grades of Modal Involvement,” from The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, revised and enlarged edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 158-176.

  4. W. V. Quine, “Reference and Modality,” from From a Logical Point of View, second, revised edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 139-159.

  5. Arthur Smullyan, “Modality and Description,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 13 (1948), 31-37.

  6. Saul Kripke, excerpts from Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 34-63, 97-105.

  7. Alfred Tarski, “On the Concept of Logical Consequence,” reprinted from Tarski’s Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, trans. J. H. Woodger, 2nd edition, ed. John Corcoran (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 409-20.

  8. A. N. Prior, “The Runabout Inference-Ticket,” Analysis 21 (1960), 38-9.

  9. N. D. Belnap, “Tonk, Plonk and Plink,” Analysis 22 (1961-2), 130-34.

  10. Dag Prawitz, “Logical Consequence From a Constructivist Point of View,” from The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, ed. Stewart Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 671-95.

  11. Robert K. Meyer, “Entailment,” Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), 808-18.

  12. John P. Burgess, “No Requirement of Relevance,” from The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, ed. Stewart Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 727-50.

  13. Alan Ross Anderson and Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., excerpts from Entailment, volume 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 150-166.

  14. Gilbert Harman, Chapters 1 and 2 of Change in View: Principles of Reasoning (Cambridge: MIT, 1986), 1-20.

  15. David Lewis, “Logic for Equivocators,” Papers in Philosophical Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 97-110.

  16. Alan Ross Anderson, Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., and J. Michael Dunn, “A useful four-valued logic,” from sec. 81 of Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, volume II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 506-524.

  17. James F. Thomson, “In Defense of ‘’,” Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990), 57-70.

  18. Dorothy Edgington, “Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions,” from A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic, ed. R.I.G. Hughes (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 28-49.

  19. Robert Stalnaker, “Indicative Conditionals,” Chapter 3 of Context and Content (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 63-77.

  20. Vann McGee, “A Counterexample to Modus Ponens,” Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985), 462-71.

  21. Keith DeRose and Richard E. Grandy, “Conditional Assertions and ‘Biscuit’ Conditionals,” Nous 33 (1999), 405-420.

  22. Mark Sainsbury, “Vagueness: the Paradox of the Heap,” Chapter 2 of Paradoxes, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 22-51.

  23. Timothy Williamson, Vagueness (London: Routledge, 1994), Chapters 4 and 5, 96-164.

  24. Gareth Evans, “Can There Be Vague Objects?”, Analysis 38 (1978), 208.