Coursebook Contents

Philosophy 142—Philosophical Logic
Professor John MacFarlane (Spring 2008)

  1. Leonard Linsky, “Two Concepts of Quantification,” Nous 6 (1972), 224–239.

  2. George Boolos, “To Be is to Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some Variables,” from Logic, Logic, and Logic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 54–72.

  3. W. V. Quine, “Three Grades of Modal Involvement,” from The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, revised and enlarged edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 158–176.

  4. W. V. Quine, “Reference and Modality,” from From a Logical Point of View, second, revised edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 139–159.

  5. Arthur Smullyan, “Modality and Description,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 13 (1948), 31–37.

  6. Saul Kripke, excerpts from Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 34–63, 97–105.

  7. Alfred Tarski, “On the Concept of Logical Consequence,” reprinted from Tarski’s Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, trans. J. H. Woodger, 2nd edition, ed. John Corcoran (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 409–20.

  8. A. N. Prior, “The Runabout Inference-Ticket,” Analysis 21 (1960), 38–9.

  9. N. D. Belnap, “Tonk, Plonk and Plink,” Analysis 22 (1961–2), 130–34.

  10. Dag Prawitz, “Logical Consequence From a Constructivist Point of View,” from The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, ed. Stewart Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 671–95.

  11. Robert K. Meyer, “Entailment,” Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), 808–18.

  12. John P. Burgess, “No Requirement of Relevance,” from The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, ed. Stewart Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 727–50.

  13. Alan Ross Anderson and Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., excerpts from Entailment, volume 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 150–166.

  14. Gilbert Harman, Chapters 1 and 2 of Change in View: Principles of Reasoning (Cambridge: MIT, 1986), 1–20.

  15. David Lewis, “Logic for Equivocators,” Papers in Philosophical Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 97–110.

  16. Alan Ross Anderson, Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., and J. Michael Dunn, “A useful four-valued logic,” from sec. 81 of Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, volume II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 506–524.

  17. James F. Thomson, “In Defense of ‘⊃’,” Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990), 57–70.

  18. Dorothy Edgington, “Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions,” from A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic, ed. R.I.G. Hughes (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 28–49.

  19. Robert Stalnaker, “Indicative Conditionals,” Chapter 3 of Context and Content (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 63–77.

  20. Vann McGee, “A Counterexample to Modus Ponens,” Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985), 462–71.

  21. Keith DeRose and Richard E. Grandy, “Conditional Assertions and ‘Biscuit’ Conditionals,” Nous 33 (1999), 405–420.

  22. Mark Sainsbury, “Vagueness: the Paradox of the Heap,” Chapter 2 of Paradoxes, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 22–51.

  23. Timothy Williamson, Vagueness (London: Routledge, 1994), Chapters 4 and 5, 96–164.

  24. Gareth Evans, “Can There Be Vague Objects?”, Analysis 38 (1978), 208.