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If the complement clause ascribes a first-person content, it expresses enrichment over what is conveyed by ‘he is courageous’ or ‘he himself is courageous’ standing alone. However, the enrichment is not captured by Recanati’s formula,

(16) John believes of himself, thought of as ‘he himself’, that he is courageous,

because John does not think of himself as ‘he himself’, in which case (15) involves no “deference” to the character John associates with *that* expression. We come closer to what is wanted with

(17) John believes of himself, thought of as ‘I’, that he is courageous.

But this not only departs from the mixed quotation paradigm, it is an interpretation that appears driven by the semantics of the quasi-indexical embedment. The required context shift introducing the ascriber’s character cannot be traced to the semantics of ‘he himself’ *per se*, since that expression has other uses. Quasi-indexical attributions may be an arena within which Kaplan’s Thesis does not hold.

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References

- Davidson, Donald. 1968. On saying that. *Synthese* 19:130–46.
Kaplan, David. 1989. Demonstratives. In *Themes from Kaplan*, edited by J. Almog, H. Wettstein, and J. Perry, 481–563. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Colin McGinn, *Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Pp. vi, 114.

The aim of this short book is to discuss the traditional topics of philosophical logic without the “formalistic fetishism and scholasticism” that McGinn associates with recent work in the field (vi). The writing is indeed crisp, engaging, and free of formalisms. The book consists of five separate essays—one each on identity, existence, predication, necessity, and truth—loosely united by the general theme that these “logical properties” are real and irreducible. “These concepts,” McGinn says, “form a conceptual bedrock; they stand, as it were, underneath all our other concepts. They have no *analysis*” (104–5).

Three of the chapters—on identity, existence, and necessity—are largely devoted to polemics against quantificational *analyses* of these concepts. (A sub-

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sidary aim of the book is to deflate philosophers' "infatuation" with the quantifier.) McGinn argues that the quantificational analyses fail because they make tacit use of the very concepts being analyzed. Thus, ' $x=y$ ' cannot be analyzed as 'for all properties P , Px iff Py ', because the apparatus of quantifiers and variables cannot be understood apart from identity. Similarly, ' x exists' cannot be analyzed as 'for some object y , $y=x$ ', because the quantifier must be understood as ranging only over objects that *exist*, and not, say, Sherlock Holmes or Vulcan. And ' x is possibly F ' cannot be analyzed as 'for some world W , x is F in W ', because the quantifier must be understood as ranging only over *possible* worlds, not impossible ones.

While the point about identity is pretty uncontroversial, the other two points are more contentious, and McGinn's arguments for them beg crucial questions. For example, in his argument against the quantificational analysis of ' x exists', McGinn simply *assumes* that 'Vulcan' and 'Holmes' refer to (nonexistent) objects. But why should a proponent of the quantificational analysis accept this? There are accounts of the semantic contribution of 'Vulcan' to sentences like 'Vulcan is a planet' that do not assume that 'Vulcan' has a referent. It is an interesting question whether such accounts are tenable, but McGinn does not address this issue.

Similarly, if we assume (with McGinn) that it is coherent to talk of "impossible worlds," then in giving a quantificational analysis of 'possibly' we must explicitly limit our domain to *possible* worlds. But why should we accept this assumption? McGinn claims that his objection works "no matter what view of possible worlds you choose to adopt," explicitly mentioning David Lewis's (74). But Lewis has argued that the assumption that there are impossible worlds (or at any rate, worlds in which contradictions are true) is incoherent. On his realist view of worlds, 'in W ' is a *restrictive modifier*, like 'in Australia,' so that 'in W , P and not P ' is equivalent to 'in W , P and not in W , P —a contradiction!¹ It is strange that McGinn does not address this kind of reply, since Lewis is the most prominent advocate of the kind of quantificational analysis McGinn is attacking. (Kripke, by contrast, explicitly warns against taking the possible worlds paraphrase as a reductive analysis.)²

In addition to rejecting these quantificational analyses, McGinn makes some bold proposals of his own. He suggests that 'some' in English is really a "partial quantifier," with no existential import. In addition to existent objects (both possible and actual), it ranges over *merely intentional* objects, like Holmes and Vulcan. Where 'some' does have existential force, it is through conversational implicature. This interpretation of 'some' provides an attractively simple semantics for sentences like 'Some superheroes do not exist', but one wonders whether the gain in simplicity here justifies the problematic ontology of merely intentional objects.

McGinn rejects the orthodox treatment of modality in terms of sentential operators in favor of a thirteenth-century approach. On McGinn's view, modal

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words are *copula modifiers*: ‘Socrates is necessarily a man’ is regimented as ‘Socrates *is-necessarily* a man,’ rather than as ‘*Necessarily*: Socrates is a man’ or ‘Socrates is *necessarily-a-man*’. The modified copulae ‘is-necessarily’ and ‘is-contingently’ signify two different *modes of instantiation* of a property by an object (necessary and contingent); the unmodified copula is neutral between these modes. McGinn handles *de dicto* modality as a special case: ‘Necessarily 2+2=4’ is analyzed as ‘The proposition that 2+2=4 is-necessarily true’.

This is an intriguing alternative to the orthodox approach, and I found myself wishing for a more rigorous and detailed elaboration of it. One puzzle concerns McGinn’s treatment of ‘*a* is possibly *F*’. Clearly in uttering this sentence we are not saying that *a* instantiates *F* in the contingent mode, because the sentence might be true even if *a* is *not F*. McGinn’s only comment on the matter is in a footnote: “Instead, we are saying that the object possibly instantiates the property, where again the modal expression modifies the copula, as in ‘Socrates possibly-is a man’” (77 n. 6). Here McGinn seems to be countenancing a *third* mode of instantiation. Yet he claims in the main text that instantiation comes in *two* modes, necessary and contingent, and “[i]t is always one or the other” (80).

In the chapter on truth, McGinn defends a view he calls “thick disquotationalism.” The essence of truth, on this view, lies in the fact that for any proposition *p*, $\langle\langle p \rangle\rangle$ is true entails $\langle p \rangle$ (where ‘ $\langle p \rangle$ ’ abbreviates ‘the proposition that *p*’). McGinn parts company from orthodox disquotationalists in rejecting the converse entailment, from $\langle p \rangle$ to $\langle\langle p \rangle\rangle$ is true, in order to “leave conceptual room for the idea of a propositional speech acts that fail of truth and falsity” (95). He does not think that a theory of truth by itself should license the inference from ‘the proposition that stealing is wrong is not true’ to ‘stealing is not wrong’.³

Though McGinn does not think that truth can be *analyzed*, he thinks it can be *defined* as the *only* property that sustains the disquotation entailment: “Truth is to be defined as that property of a proposition that entails the fact (purportedly) stated by the proposition” (104). There are obvious counterexamples to the uniqueness claim: surely $\langle\langle p \rangle\rangle$ is known entails $\langle p \rangle$, as does $\langle\langle p \rangle\rangle$ follows from a truth. McGinn replies that “each of these properties includes or embeds the notion of truth, and it is this embedded truth element that is doing all the disquotational work” (99). But it is hard to see how this response would help with (say) the property of *being entailed by the proposition that everything is self-identical*. McGinn could retreat to defining truth as the *weakest* property *F* of propositions such that

(LR) for all propositions *p*, $\langle\langle p \rangle\rangle$ is *F* entails $\langle p \rangle$.⁴

However, this definition is in tension with McGinn’s rejection of the entailment from $\langle p \rangle$ to $\langle\langle p \rangle\rangle$ is true. For any property *F* that satisfies (LR) and

(RL) for all propositions *p*, $\langle p \rangle$ entails $\langle\langle p \rangle\rangle$ is *F*

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will be weaker than one that satisfies (LR) but not (RL). Unless McGinn has an argument that *there is no* property that satisfies both (LR) and (RL)—and he does not supply one—he must accept that *truth* satisfies both.

It is not surprising that a book of such wide compass and so few pages raises many questions that it does not answer. Still, there is much of interest in McGinn's book, and its lively style and provocative proposals will no doubt stimulate further work on our "conceptual bedrock."

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Notes

¹ *On the Plurality of Worlds* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 7 n. 3.

² *Naming and Necessity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 19 n. 18.

³ I do not know how to square this with McGinn's later use of the right-to-left direction of the "disquotational biconditional" (107), or his claim that "the right side [of the truth schema] gives a *necessary and sufficient* condition for truth to apply to a proposition" (95, emphasis added).

⁴ *F* is weaker than *G* iff for all propositions *p*, $\langle\langle p \rangle\rangle$ is *G* entails $\langle\langle p \rangle\rangle$ is *F*, and for at least one proposition *p*, $\langle\langle p \rangle\rangle$ is *F* does not entail $\langle\langle p \rangle\rangle$ is *G*.

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André Chapis and Anil Gupta, eds., *Circularity, Definition and Truth*. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2000. Pp. vi, 402.

This is a collection of eighteen solicited papers on the topics of the title: circularity, definition, and truth. The papers are loosely connected in subject matter, but present a great variety of issues, theories, and approaches. Amongst the many subjects discussed are: the revision theory of truth and applications of revision rules, partiality and fixed point constructions, substitutional quantification, fuzzy logic, negation, belief revision, context dependence, hierarchies, Tarski on truth, deflationism, correspondence theories of truth, and normative aspects of truth. The Liar paradox figures prominently in this collection, but is not alone. Other familiar paradoxes are also discussed, including paradoxes of definability, the Sorites paradox, and the Surprise Exam paradox. So-called paradoxes of rationality, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, receive attention as well.

As a collection of distinct papers on such a wide range of issues, this volume does not offer itself as a systematic overview of the state of the art in any particular subject. Nonetheless, many of the papers in the volume are excellent, and taken together, they provide a valuable resource for those working in the areas they address. For those with a more casual interest, they provide an interesting snapshot of some active areas of investigation. For the most part, the technical