“Ifs and Oughts,” Philosophy Colloquium, University of Toronto
Philosophy Colloquium, University of Pittsburgh
New York Institute of Philosophy Disagreement Workshop
Philosophy Colloquium, University of Texas, Austin
New York Institute of Philosophy Disagreement Workshop
Chambers Philosophy Conference on Epistemic Modals, University of Nebraska
“Ifs and Oughts,” Arché Contextualism and Relativism Conference, St. Andrews, Scotland
“What Is Assertion?”, Arché Assertion Conference, St. Andrews, Scotland
“Ifs and Oughts.” Logic Colloquium, Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science, UC Berkeley
“Ought: Between Objective and Subjective,” Philosophy Colloquium, University of Minnesota
“Ought: Between Objective and Subjective,” New York Institute of Philosophy Disagreement Workshop
“Ought: Between Objective and Subjective,” Arizona Ontology Conference, outside Tucson
“Ought: Between Objective and Subjective,” University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Philosophy Colloquium
“Ought: Between Objective and Subjective,” Workshop on Context-dependence, Perspective and Relativity in Language and Thought, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris
“In Defense of Degrees,” LOGICA 2007, Hejnice, Czech Republic
“In Defense of Degrees,” Arché Vagueness Conference, St. Andrews, Scotland
“Assertion, Information, and Commitment,” Relativism Seminar, Arché Center, St. Andrews, Scotland
“Assertion, Information, and Commitment,” Oxford, Jowett Society
“Assertion, Information, and Commitment,” UC Riverside, Philosophy Colloquium
“Assertion, Information, and Commitment,” MIT, Philosophy Colloquium
Comments on Bob Brandom’s “Elaborating Abilities: The Expressive Role of Logic,” Reprise of Locke Lectures, Prague, Czech Republic
“Assertion, Information, and Commitment,” Keynote speaker, Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Graduate Student Conference.
“Assertion, Information, and Commitment,” Pacific Division APA, Symposium on Context and Content
“Assertion, Information, and Commitment,” Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, Mexico City
“Truth and Subjectivity,” Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, Mexico City
“Truth and Subjectivity,” UC Davis, Philosophy of Language Salon
“Epistemic Modals Are Assessment-Sensitive,” University of Michigan, Linguistics and Philosophy Workshop
“Truth and Subjectivity,” University of Connecticut, Philosophy Colloquium
Comments on Peter Lasersohn’s “Relative truth, speaker commitment, and control of implicit arguments,” Rutgers Semantics Workshop
“The Logic of Confusion,” Camp Out!, Pittsburgh
“Relativism and Disagreement,” New York University, Philosophy Colloquium
“Relativism and Disagreement,” Symposium on Relative Truth in Semantics, Pacific Division APA, Portland
“Epistemic Modals Are Assessment-Sensitive,” University of California, Berkeley, Logic and Methodology of Science Colloquium
“Relativist Semantics for Epistemic Modals,” Informational Session on Epistemic Modals, Eastern Division APA, New York
“On Some Objections to Relativist Semantics,” Workshop on Relativism, University of Oslo, Norway
“Epistemic Possibility,” UC Santa Cruz Philosophy Department
“Nonindexical Contextualism,” UCLA Philosophy Colloquium
“Nonindexical Contextualism,” Rutgers Semantics Workshop
“Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths,” LOGOS Workshop on Relativizing Utterance Truth, Barcelona
Fourth International Conference on Logic and Cognition, Zhongshan (Sun Yat-Sen) University, Guangzhou, China, “Making Sense of Relative Truth”
Arche Center, St. Andrews, Epistemology Seminar, “Epistemic Possibility”
Arche Center, St. Andrews, Vagueness Seminar, “Non-indexical Contextualism”
Arche Center, St. Andrews, Philosophy Club, “Making Sense of Relative Truth”
Arche Center, St. Andrews, Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar, “Double Vision: Two Questions About the Neo-Fregean Programme.”
Aristotelian Society, London, “Making Sense of Relative Truth”
Bristol University, Philosophy Department Research Seminar (and keynote speaker for the postgraduate conference “Novel approaches in the philosophies of the natural and mathematical sciences”), “Making Sense of Relative Truth”
Ohio State University, Philosophy Colloquium, “Epistemic Possibility.”
University of Chicago Wittgenstein Workshop, “Epistemic Possibility.”
Pacific Division APA, San Francisco, Author Meets Critics Session on Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore, Insensitive Semantics, “Semantic Minimalism and Non-Indexical Contextualism”
SOFIA Conference, Huatulco, Mexico, comments on Allan Gibbard, “Truth and Correct Belief”
University of California, San Diego, Philosophy Colloquium, “Making Sense of Relativism About Truth”
University of California, Santa Barbara, Philosophy Colloquium, “How to Be a Relativist About Truth”
Central Division APA, Chicago, Symposium on the Normativity of Logic, “In What Sense (If Any) Is Logic Normative for Thought?”
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Philosophy of Logic Workshop, Comments on Gila Sher, “Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Logic, Truth and Knowledge.”
Princeton University, Philosophy Colloquium, “How to Be a Relativist About Truth”
Harvard University, Philosophy Colloquium, “How to Be a Relativist About Truth”
University of California, Berkeley, Logic and Methodology of Science Colloquium, “In What Sense (If Any) Is Logic Normative for Thought?”
University of California, Irvine, Logic and Philosophy of Science Colloquium, “A Relativist Semantics for ‘S knows that p’”
Yale University, “Themes in Philosophy of Language” Conference, “A Relativist Semantics for ‘S knows that p’”
University of Utah, Philosophy Colloquium, “Epistemic Modalities and Relative Truth”
Stanford University, Philosophy Colloquium, “A Relativist Semantics for ‘S knows that p’”
University of Notre Dame, Seminar on Philosophy of Mathematics, “Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism.”
Pacific Division APA, San Francisco, Author Meets Critics: Crispin Wright and Bob Hale, The Reason’s Proper Study, “Double Vision: Two Questions About the Neo-Fregean Programme.”
Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science Colloquium, UC Berkeley, “Future Contingents and Relative Truth.”
ECAP 4, Lund, Sweden, “A Valuational (but not Supervaluational) Approach to Vagueness.”
Working Group in the History and Philosophy of Logic, Mathematics, and Science, UC Berkeley, “A Valuational (but not Super valuational) Approach to Vagueness.”
Pacific Division APA Symposium, San Francisco, comments on Augustin Rayo, “Frege’s Unofficial Arithmetic.”
Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science Colloquium, UC Berkeley, “Topic-neutrality.”
Pacific Division APA Colloquium, Albuquerque, “What is Modeled by Truth in All Models?”
Princeton University, “Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism.”
New York University, “Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism.”
Stanford University, “Permutation Invariance and the Generality of Logic.”
University of California at Los Angeles, “Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism.”
University of California at Berkeley, “Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism.”
University of California at Davis, “Aristotelian Matter Unified.”
University of Texas at Austin, “Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism.”
University of Michigan, “Aristotelian Matter Unified.”
University of New Mexico, “Aristotle’s Argument for the Substantiality of Matter.”
Central Division APA Colloquium, New Orleans, “Boghossian on the Analyticity of Logic.”