| Department of Philosophy | Tel: | (510) 642–3174 |
| University of California, Berkeley | Fax: | (510) 642–4164 |
| 314 Moses Hall #2390 | E-mail: | |
| Berkeley, CA 94720–2390 | Web: | http://johnmacfarlane.net |
Department of Philosophy, University of California at Berkeley:
Ph.D., Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 2000.
M.A., Classics, University of Pittsburgh, 1997.
M.A., Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 1994.
A.B., Philosophy, summa cum laude, Harvard University, 1991.
Humanities Research Fellowship, University of California, Berkeley, Fall 2003 and Fall 2008.
Nominee, Distinguished Faculty Mentors Award, 2004, University of California, Berkeley, Graduate Assembly.
Scheduled Fellow, Stanford Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.
ACLS/Andrew W. Mellon Fellowship for Junior Faculty, 2003–2004.
The Philosophical Quarterly Essay Prize for “Future Contingents and Relative Truth,” 2002 (£1000).
Junior Faculty Mentor Grant, University of California, Berkeley, 2002.
Research Enabling Grant, University of California, Berkeley, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008.
Michigan Society of Fellows, offered 2000–2003, declined.
Michael R. Bennett Prize in Philosophy, 1998–9, University of Pittsburgh ($300).
Andrew W. Mellon Fellowship in the Humanities, Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation, 1992–1994, 1997.
Alan Ross Anderson Fellowship, University of Pittsburgh, Fall 1995 and Spring 2000.
Thomas T. Hoopes Prize, Harvard College, 1991.
“Pragmatism and Inferentialism,” forthcoming in Reading Brandom: Making It Explicit, ed. B. Weiss and J. Wanderer (Routledge).
“Epistemic Modals are Assessment-Sensitive,” forthcoming in an Oxford University Press collection on epistemic modals, ed. B. Weatherson and E. Egan.
“Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths,” forthcoming in Relative Truth, ed. M. Kolbel and M. Garcia-Carpintero (Oxford University Press).
“Double Vision: Two Questions About the Neo-Fregean Program,” forthcoming in Synthese.http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9260-z
“Nonindexical Contextualism,” forthcoming in Synthese.http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9286-2
“Boghossian, Bellarmine, and Bayes,” forthcoming in a Philosophical Studies book symposium on Paul Boghossian’s Fear of Knowledge.
“Semantic Minimalism and Nonindexical Contextualism,” in Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics, ed. G. Preyer and G. Peter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 240–50.
“The Logic of Confusion,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007), 700–708 (book symposium on Joseph Camp, Jr., Confusion: A Study in the Theory of Knowledge).
“The Things We (Sorta Kinda) Believe,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73 (2006), 218–224 (book symposium on Stephen Schiffer, The Things We Mean).
“Relativism and Disagreement,” Philosophical Studies 132 (2007), 17–31.
“The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005), ed. T. Szabó-Gendler and J. Hawthorne, 197–233.
“Logical Constants,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-constants/
“Making Sense of Relative Truth,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2005), 321–39.
“Knowledge Laundering: Testimony and Sensitive Invariantism,” Analysis 65 (2005), 132–8.
“McDowell’s Kantianism,” Theoria 70 (2004), 250–65.
“Future Contingents and Relative Truth,” The Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003), 321–36.
“Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism,” The Philosophical Review 111 (2002), 25–65.
“Aristotle’s Definition of Anagnôrisis,” American Journal of Philology 121 (2000), 367–383.
Review of Myles Burnyeat, A Map of Metaphysics Zeta, The Philosophical Review 112 (2003), 97–99.
Review of Colin McGinn, Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth, The Philosophical Review 111 (2002), 534–7.
Review of Stephen Neale, Facing Facts, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002.8.15.http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1117
Review of Michael Potter, Reason’s Nearest Kin: Philosophies of Arithmetic from Kant to Carnap, Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2001), 454–6.
“What Is Assertion?”, Arché Assertion Workshop, St. Andrews, Scotland, May 24, 2008.
“Ifs and Oughts” (with Niko Kolodny),
“Ought: Between Objective and Subjective” (with Niko Kolodny),
“In Defense of Degrees,”
“Assertion, Information, and Commitment,”
Comments on Bob Brandom’s “Elaborating Abilities: The Expressive Role of Logic,” Prague Locke Lectures, April 28, 2007.
“Truth and Subjectivity,”
“Epistemic Modals are Assessment-Sensitive,”
Comments on Peter Lasersohn’s “Relative Truth, Speaker Commitment, and Control of Implicit Arguments,” Rutgers Semantics Workshop, September 29, 2006.
“The Logic of Confusion,” “Camp Out!” Conference in honor of Joseph Camp, Jr., University of Pittsburgh, April 8, 2006.
“Relativism and Disagreement,”
“Relativist Semantics for Epistemic Modals,” Informational Session on Epistemic Modals, Eastern Division APA, New York, December 30, 2005.
“On Some Objections to Relativist Semantics,” Workshop on Relativism, University of Oslo, Norway, November 10–11, 2005.
“Epistemic Possibility,”
“Nonindexical Contextualism,”
“Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths,” Workshop on Relativizing Utterance Truth, Barcelona, September 5, 2005.
“Making Sense of Relative Truth,”
“Double Vision: Two Questions about the Neo-Fregean Programme,”
“Semantic Minimalism and Non-Indexical Contextualism,” at Author-Meets-Critics Session on Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore, Insensitive Semantics, Pacific APA, San Francisco, March 26, 2005.
Comments on Allan Gibbard, “Truth and Correct Belief,” SOFIA Conference, Huatulco, Mexico, January 12, 2005.
“Making Sense of Relativism About Truth,” Philosophy Colloquium, University of California, San Diego, October 1, 2004.
“How to Be a Relativist About Truth,”
“In What Sense (If Any) Is Logic Normative for Thought?”,
Comments on Gila Sher, “Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Logic, Truth and Knowledge,” Philosophy of Logic Workshop, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, April 17, 2004.
“A Relativist Semantics for ‘S knows that P’,”
“Epistemic Modalities and Relative Truth,” University of Utah Philosophy Colloquium, October 31, 2003.
“Future Contingents and Relative Truth,” Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science, University of California at Berkeley, November 1, 2002.
“A Valuational (but not Supervaluational) Approach to Vagueness,”
Comments on Agustín Rayo, “Frege’s Unofficial Arithmetic,” Pacific Division APA Symposium, San Francisco, March 29, 2001.
“Topic-neutrality,” colloquium talk, Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science, University of California at Berkeley, September 15, 2000.
“What Is Modeled by Truth in All Models,” Pacific Division APA Colloquium, Albuquerque, April 8, 2000.
“Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism,”
“Aristotelian Matter Unified,”
“Aristotle’s Argument for the Substantiality of Matter,” University of New Mexico, May 14, 1999.
“Boghossian on the Analyticity of Logic,” Central Division APA Colloquium, New Orleans, May 8, 1999.
Comments on Charles Kelly, “Aristotle on the Conversion of Apodeictic Propositions,” Central Division APA Colloquium, Pittsburgh, April 26, 1997.
Comments on Matthew McKeon, “Models, Validity, and Possible Worlds,” Eastern Division APA Colloquium, Atlanta, December 28, 1996.
Member, New York Institute of Philosophy, Project on the Nature, Limits, and Significance of Disagreement.
Co-organizer, “Interpolations: A Conference in Honor of William Craig,” University of California, Berkeley, May 13, 2007.
APA Eastern Division Advisory Committee to the Program Committee (Logic, 2003–2006).
Advisory Board, Review of Symbolic Logic.
Editorial Board (Philosophy of Logic), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Editorial Board (Philosophy of Language and Logic), Blackwell’s Philosophy Compass.
Editorial Board, Semantics and Pragmatics.
Referee for MIT Press (2001), Oxford University Press (2002, 2004, 2005, 2007), Journal of Symbolic Logic (2001), History and Philosophy of Logic (2002), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2003), Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2003), Nous (2004, 2007), Philosophical Papers (2004), Philosophia Mathematica (2004, 2005), Philosophical Studies (2004, 2005, 2007), American Philosophical Quarterly (2005), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2005), Linguistics and Philosophy (2005), Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2006), Philosopher’s Imprint (2006, 2007), Erkenntnis (2006), Blackwell Philosophy Compass (2006), Philosophical Review (2007), Mind (2007).
Member of American Philosophical Association.
University of California, Berkeley:
University of Pittsburgh:
Inside member, Kenneth Easwaran (Logic), “The Foundations of Conditional Probability” (submitted Spring 2008).
Inside member Michael Titelbaum (Philosophy), “Quitting Certainties: A Doxastic Modeling Framework” (submitted Spring 2008).
Inside member, Andreas Anagnostopoulos (Philosophy), “Aristotle on Change and Potentiality” (submitted Fall 2007).
Outside member, Alice Medvedev (Mathematics), “Minimal Sets in ACFA” (submitted Spring 2007).
Inside member, Berislav Marusic (Philosophy), “Skepticism Between Absurdity and Idleness” (submitted Spring 2007).
External member, Isidora Stojanovic (Stanford, Philosophy), “What Is Said: An Inquiry Into Reference, Meaning, and Content” (submitted Spring 2007).
Inside member, Bence Nanay (Philosophy), “How Animals See the World: A Theory of Content for Action-Oriented Perceptual States” (submitted Spring 2006).
Inside member, Johannes Hafner (Logic), “From Metamathematics to Philosophy: A Critical Assessment of Putnam’s Model-Theoretic Argument” (submitted Fall 2005).
Outside member, Apollo Hogan (Mathematics), “General Topology under the Axiom of Determinacy: the Beauty of Topology without Choice” submitted Fall 2005).
Third member, Elisabeth Camp (Philosophy), “Saying and Seeing-As: The Linguistic Uses and Cognitive Effects of Metaphor” (submitted Summer 2003).
Co-chair, Omar Mirza (Logic), “Naturalism and Darwin’s Doubt: A Study of Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism” (submitted Spring 2003).
Daniel Long, “Supposition” (Spring 2002). Honors.
Nicholas Riggle, “Defective Concepts” (Spring 2006). Highest Honors.
Reading knowledge of Ancient Greek, Latin, French, German