Talks

Upcoming talks and conferences

  1. March 27, 2026 - April 03, 2026, TBA, NYU, New York Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series.

Recent talks

  1. September 27, 2024, Disagreement and Meaning, Workshop in Law, Philosophy, and Political Theory, Kadish Center, UC Berkeley.

  2. September 12, 2024, Disagreement and Meaning, Berkeley Undergraduate Philosophy Forum.

  3. April 26, 2024, Panvariabilism, Philosophy Colloquium, University of Maryland.

  4. February 24, 2024, Symposium on Vague Assertion (comments), Central Division APA, New Orleans.

  5. October 01, 2023, Change in View: A Changed View, Harmania: A Conference in Honor of Gilbert Harman, Princeton University.

  6. April 03, 2023, Belief: What is it Good For?, Work in Progress Talk, UC Berkeley Philosophy Department.

  7. February 28, 2023, Pandoc Support for Ipynb, Jupyter Notebook File Format Workshop, Massy, France (remote).

  8. September 15, 2022, Belief: What is it Good For?, GAP 11 (German Society for Analytic Philosophy), Humboldt University, Berlin, Keynote address.

  9. July 14, 2022, Panel Discussion (remote), Conference on Cross-Linguistic Disagreement, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology.

  10. June 28, 2022 - June 29, 2022, Do Vague Utterances Communicate Probabilistic Information?, Paris-Berkeley Workshop on Probability and Meaning.

  11. April 16, 2022, Book Symposium on Patrick Todd, The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are all False, Pacific Division APA, Vancouver.

  12. July 22, 2021, Author Meets Critics, Maria Baghramian and Annalisa Coliva, Relativism, Truth 2021 Conference, Virtual International Consortium for Truth Research (VICTR). text of paper

  13. September 24, 2020, Indeterminacy as Indecision, Woodbridge Lectures, Columbia University.

  14. September 23, 2020, Seeing Through the Clouds, Woodbridge Lectures, Columbia University.

  15. September 22, 2020, Vagueness and Communication, Woodbridge Lectures, Columbia University.

  16. July 26, 2020, Pandoc for TeXnicians, TUG 2020 (TeX Users Group, 41st Annual Conference), Keynote address. slides

  17. October 25, 2019, Seeing Through the Clouds, UCSD Philosophy Colloquium.

  18. June 19, 2019 - June 21, 2019, Pinning Down Plato’s Protagoras, Conference on Truth and Relativism in Ancient Philosophy, University of Groningen.

  19. April 26, 2019, Seeing Through the Clouds, Philosophy Colloquium, Princeton University.

  20. February 20, 2019 - February 23, 2019, Author Meets Critics Symposium on Sarah Moss’s book Probabilistic Knowledge , Central Division APA, Denver.

  21. April 13, 2018, How to Resist Epistemicism, Hume Society Colloquium Talk, Stanford University.

  22. April 07, 2018, Comments on Jack Spencer, “Relative Truth, Absolute Correctness”, Philosophy of Language Workshop, Stanford.

  23. January 26, 2018, Is Logic a Normative Discipline?, Logic Colloquium, UC Berkeley.

  24. November 10, 2017, How to Resist Epistemicism, Philosophy Colloquium, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

  25. September 29, 2017, Constraint Semantics, William Alston Lecture, Syracuse University.

  26. June 14, 2017 - June 16, 2017, Is Logic a Normative Discipline?, Conference on the Normativity of Logic, University of Bergen, Norway. text of paper

  27. June 08, 2017, Constraint Semantics, Philosophy Colloquium, University of Konstanz.

  28. June 05, 2017 - June 07, 2017, Constraint Semantics, Keynote, Philosophy Meets Linguistics Conference, Zürich.

  29. May 30, 2017, What You Ought to Believe, EHESS, Seminar on les attitudes épistémiques, Paris .

  30. April 18, 2017, Constraint Semantics, Workshop on Contextual Indeterminacy and Semantic Theory, Institut d’Études Avancées, Paris.

  31. November 11, 2016, Vagueness as Indecision, Conference on “Kinds of Indeterminacy,” University of Geneva.

  32. October 14, 2016, Vagueness as Indecision, Colloquium, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris.

  33. October 11, 2016, An Expressivist Account of Vagueness, Internal Seminar, IEA Paris.

  34. September 10, 2016, Vagueness as Indecision, Conference on What Is Said and What Is Meant, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.

  35. July 10, 2016, Vagueness as Indecision, Symposium, The Joint Session, Cardiff University.

  36. March 30, 2016, Commentator in Group Session on Experimental Work in Formal Semantics, Pacific Division APA Meeting.

  37. March 16, 2016, Berkeley Book Chat on Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications , Townsend Center for the Humanities.

  38. March 12, 2016, Vagueness as Indecision, Meaning Sciences Workshop, Berkeley.

  39. March 05, 2016, Author Meets Critics, Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications , Central Division APA Meeting. text of paper

  40. November 23, 2015, Vagueness as Indecision, Work in Progress Seminar, Philosophy Department, UC Berkeley.

  41. November 06, 2015, Vagueness as Indecision, Philosophy Colloquium, University of California, Davis.

  42. October 02, 2015, Vagueness as Indecision, University of Chicago, Wittgenstein Workshop.

  43. October 01, 2015, Workshop on Assessment Sensitivity, University of Chicago, Working Group on the Nature of Subjectivity.

  44. June 01, 2015 - June 05, 2015, Workshop on Assessment Sensitivity, Universität Bonn.

  45. March 25, 2015, Pandoc Fu, Group for Experimental Methods in the Humanities, Columbia University.

  46. March 24, 2015, Assessment Sensitivity, NYU Mind and Language Seminar.

  47. May 17, 2014, Pandoc for Haskell Hackers, BayHac 2014. slides

  48. March 27, 2014, The Rationality of Relativism, Reed College.

  49. July 11, 2013, Objective and Subjective Oughts, Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Scotland, Relativism & Rational Tolerance Workshop III.

  50. July 08, 2013, The Rationality of Relativism, Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Scotland, Master Class Seminar.

  51. July 08, 2013, Relativism vs. Expressivism: the Case of Epistemic Modals, Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Scotland, Master Class Seminar.

  52. April 12, 2013, Objective and Subjective Oughts, Philosophy and Linguistics Colloquium, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

  53. April 11, 2013, The Rationality of Relativism, Philosophy Colloquium, Illinois Wesleyan University.

  54. April 06, 2013, The Rationality of Relativism, Keynote speaker, Berkeley-Stanford-Davis graduate philosophy conference, Berkeley.

  55. March 27, 2013, Comments on Caleb Perl, “How to Outfox Sly Pete: Semantics for Indicatives”, Symposium on Indicatives, Pacific APA, San Francisco.

  56. March 22, 2013, Objective and Subjective Oughts, Philosophy Colloquium, McGill University.

  57. February 01, 2013, On the Medieval Distinction Between Formal and Material Consequence, Logic Colloquium, Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science, Berkeley.

  58. November 09, 2012, Objective and Subjective Oughts, Philosophy Colloquium, Ohio State.

  59. September 28, 2012, Objective and Subjective Oughts, Philosophy Colloquium, University of Notre Dame.

  60. September 14, 2012, Objective and Subjective Oughts, Philosophy Colloquium, MIT.

  61. June 14, 2012, Abelard’s Argument for Formality, 19th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Geneva.

  62. June 02, 2012, Objective and Subjective Oughts, First CSLI Workshop on Logic, Rationality, and Intelligent Interaction, Stanford.

  63. May 18, 2012, The Sorites Paradox, Philosophy Club, Berkeley High School.

  64. March 30, 2012, Objective and Subjective Oughts, Princeton University, Whitney J. Oates Fellow in the Humanities Council and the Philosophy department.

  65. March 28, 2012, Relativism vs. Expressivism: the Case of Epistemic Modals, Princeton University, Whitney J. Oates Fellow in the Humanities Council and the Philosophy department.

  66. March 27, 2012, The Rationality of Relativism, Princeton University, Whitney J. Oates Fellow in the Humanities Council and the Philosophy department.

  67. February 18, 2012, Relativism vs. Expressivism: the Case of Epistemic Modals, Keynote speaker, USC/UCLA Graduate Student Philosophy Conference.

  68. July 02, 2011, Relativism vs. Expressivism: the Case of Epistemic Modals, EPR3 (Expressivism, Pragmatism, and Representationalism), Sydney, Australia.

  69. April 08, 2011, Why Assessment Sensitivity?, Philosophy Colloquium, Cornell University.

  70. January 13, 2011, A Puzzle about Modal Uncertainty, Santa Cruz Linguistics and Philosophy group, Distinguished Visitor Series.

  71. December 27, 2010 - December 30, 2010, Comments on Code and Simons, Eastern Division APA, Boston, Symposium on hylomorphic metaphysics.

  72. November 19, 2010, A Puzzle about Modal Uncertainty, Philosophy Colloquium, Brown University.

  73. September 19, 2010 - October 09, 2010, Assessment Sensitivity, Context and Content Lectures, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris.

  74. June 14, 2010, A Puzzle about Modal Uncertainty, Workshop on philosophy of logic, IHPST, Paris.

  75. June 07, 2010 - June 11, 2010, Five Seminars on Assessment Sensitivity, University of Bologna, Italy.

  76. June 05, 2010, What You Ought to Believe, Conference on Truth (and Relativism), Bologna, Italy. handout

  77. May 28, 2010, What You Ought to Believe, G[af], University of Buenos Aires. handout

  78. May 27, 2010, Ifs and Oughts, G[af], University of Buenos Aires.

  79. May 24, 2010, Varieties of Disagreement, G[af], University of Buenos Aires.

  80. April 30, 2010, Varieties of Disagreement, Department of Philosophy, The New School.

  81. April 16, 2010, Epistemic Modals: Relativism vs. Cloudy Contextualism, Chambers Philosophy Conference on Epistemic Modals, University of Nebraska. text of paper slides

  82. April 04, 2010, Richard on Truth and Commitment, Author Meets Critics Session on Mark Richard, When Truth Gives Out, Pacific Division APA, San Francisco. text of paper

  83. January 29, 2010, Fuzzy Epistemicism, Logic Colloquium, Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science, Berkeley.

  84. January 15, 2010, Ifs and Oughts, Philosophy Colloquium, UC Irvine.

  85. November 13, 2009, Varieties of Disagreement, Mini-conference on the work of François Recanati, University of Chicago, Workshop on Semantics and the Philosophy of Language.

  86. May 20, 2009, Varieties of Disagreement, Institute of Philosophy, University of London.

  87. May 15, 2009, Varieties of Disagreement, Conference on relativism, University College Dublin.

  88. April 28, 2009, Ifs and Oughts, Syntax and Semantics Circle, UC Berkeley Department of Linguistics.

  89. March 23, 2009 - April 03, 2009, Six seminars on assessment sensitivity, University of Barcelona.

  90. December 05, 2008, Ifs and Oughts, Philosophy Colloquium, University of Texas, Austin.

  91. September 26, 2008, Ifs and Oughts, Philosophy Colloquium, University of Pittsburgh.

  92. September 25, 2008, Ifs and Oughts, Philosophy Colloquium, University of Toronto.

  93. May 30, 2008, Ifs and Oughts, Arché Contextualism and Relativism Conference, St. Andrews, Scotland.

  94. May 24, 2008, What Is Assertion?, Arché Assertion Conference, St. Andrews, Scotland.

  95. April 18, 2008, Ifs and Oughts, Logic Colloquium, Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science, UC Berkeley.

  96. March 28, 2008, Ought: Between Objective and Subjective, Philosophy Colloquium, University of Minnesota.

  97. March 01, 2008, Ought: Between Objective and Subjective, New York Institute of Philosophy Disagreement Workshop.

  98. January 09, 2008 - January 13, 2008, Ought: Between Objective and Subjective, Arizona Ontology Conference, outside Tucson.

  99. December 14, 2007, Ought: Between Objective and Subjective, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Philosophy Colloquium.

  100. November 11, 2007, Ought: Between Objective and Subjective, Workshop on Context-dependence, Perspective and Relativity in Language and Thought, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris.

  101. June 22, 2007, In Defense of Degrees, LOGICA 2007, Hejnice, Czech Republic.

  102. June 08, 2007, In Defense of Degrees, Arché Vagueness Conference, St. Andrews, Scotland.

  103. June 06, 2007, Assertion, Information, and Commitment, Relativism Seminar, Arché Center, St. Andrews, Scotland.

  104. June 01, 2007, Assertion, Information, and Commitment, Oxford, Jowett Society.

  105. May 09, 2007, Assertion, Information, and Commitment, UC Riverside, Philosophy Colloquium.

  106. May 04, 2007, Assertion, Information, and Commitment, MIT, Philosophy Colloquium.

  107. April 28, 2007, Comments on Bob Brandom’s “Elaborating Abilities: The Expressive Role of Logic”, Reprise of Locke Lectures, Prague, Czech Republic.

  108. April 14, 2007, Assertion, Information, and Commitment, Keynote, Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Graduate Student Conference.

  109. April 07, 2007, Assertion, Information, and Commitment, Pacific Division APA, Symposium on Context and Content.

  110. March 29, 2007, Assertion, Information, and Commitment, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, Mexico City.

  111. March 28, 2007, Truth and Subjectivity, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, Mexico City.

  112. January 11, 2007, Truth and Subjectivity, UC Davis, Philosophy of Language Salon.

  113. November 03, 2006 - November 05, 2006, Epistemic Modals Are Assessment-Sensitive, Linguistics and Philosophy Workshop, University of Michigan.

  114. October 13, 2006, Truth and Subjectivity, University of Connecticut, Philosophy Colloquium.

  115. September 29, 2006, Comments on Peter Lasersohn, “Relative truth, speaker commitment, and control of implicit arguments”, Rutgers Semantics Workshop. text of paper

  116. April 07, 2006 - April 08, 2006, The Logic of Confusion, Camp Out!, Pittsburgh.

  117. March 31, 2006, Relativism and Disagreement, New York University, Philosophy Colloquium.

  118. March 25, 2006, Relativism and Disagreement, Symposium on Relative Truth in Semantics, Pacific Division APA, Portland.

  119. February 03, 2006, Epistemic Modals Are Assessment-Sensitive, University of California, Berkeley, Logic and Methodology of Science Colloquium.

  120. December 30, 2005, Relativist Semantics for Epistemic Modals, Informational Session on Epistemic Modals, Eastern Division APA, New York.

  121. November 11, 2005, On Some Objections to Relativist Semantics, Workshop on Relativism, University of Oslo, Norway.

  122. October 27, 2005, Epistemic Possibility, UC Santa Cruz Philosophy Department.

  123. October 21, 2005, Nonindexical Contextualism, UCLA Philosophy Colloquium.

  124. September 17, 2005, Nonindexical Contextualism, Rutgers Semantics Workshop.

  125. September 05, 2005, Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths, LOGOS Workshop on Relativizing Utterance Truth, Barcelona.

  126. June 13, 2005, Making Sense of Relative Truth, Fourth International Conference on Logic and Cognition, Zhongshan (Sun Yat-Sen) University, Guangzhou, China.

  127. June 10, 2005, Epistemic Possibility, Arche Center, St. Andrews, Epistemology Seminar.

  128. June 09, 2005, Double Vision: Two Questions about the Neo-Fregean Programme, Arche Center, St. Andrews, Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar.

  129. June 08, 2005, Non-indexical Contextualism, Arche Center, St. Andrews, Vagueness Seminar.

  130. June 08, 2005, Making Sense of Relative Truth, Arche Center, St. Andrews, Philosophy Club.

  131. June 06, 2005, Making Sense of Relative Truth, Aristotelian Society, London.

  132. June 03, 2005, Making Sense of Relative Truth, Bristol University, Philosophy Department Research Seminar (and keynote speaker for the postgraduate conference “Novel approaches in the philosophies of the natural and mathematical sciences”).

  133. May 20, 2005, Epistemic Possibility, Ohio State University, Philosophy Colloquium.

  134. April 15, 2005, Epistemic Possibility, University of Chicago Wittgenstein Workshop.

  135. March 26, 2005, Semantic Minimalism and Non-Indexical Contextualism, Pacific Division APA, San Francisco, Author Meets Critics Session on Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore, Insensitive Semantics.

  136. January 12, 2005, Truth and Correct Belief, SOFIA Conference, Huatulco, Mexico, comments on Allan Gibbard.

  137. October 01, 2004, Making Sense of Relativism About Truth, University of California, San Diego, Philosophy Colloquium.

  138. May 21, 2004, How to Be a Relativist About Truth, University of California, Santa Barbara, Philosophy Colloquium.

  139. April 25, 2004, In What Sense (If Any) Is Logic Normative for Thought?, Central Division APA, Chicago, Symposium on the Normativity of Logic.

  140. April 17, 2004, Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Logic, Truth and Knowledge., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Philosophy of Logic Workshop, Comments on Gila Sher.

  141. April 02, 2004, How to Be a Relativist About Truth, Princeton University, Philosophy Colloquium.

  142. March 11, 2004, How to Be a Relativist About Truth, Harvard University, Philosophy Colloquium.

  143. March 05, 2004, In What Sense (If Any) Is Logic Normative for Thought?, University of California, Berkeley, Logic and Methodology of Science Colloquium.

  144. December 05, 2003, A Relativist Semantics for ‘S knows that p’, University of California, Irvine, Logic and Philosophy of Science Colloquium.

  145. November 08, 2003, A Relativist Semantics for ‘S knows that p’, “Themes in Philosophy of Language” Conference, Yale University.

  146. October 31, 2003, Epistemic Modalities and Relative Truth, University of Utah, Philosophy Colloquium.

  147. October 17, 2003, A Relativist Semantics for ‘S knows that p’, Stanford University, Philosophy Colloquium.

  148. April 24, 2003, Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism, University of Notre Dame, Seminar on Philosophy of Mathematics.

  149. March 28, 2003, Double Vision: Two Questions about the Neo-Fregean Programme, Pacific Division APA, San Francisco, Author Meets Critics Session.

  150. November 01, 2002, Future Contingents and Relative Truth, Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science Colloquium, UC Berkeley.

  151. June 15, 2002, A Valuational (but not Supervaluational) Approach to Vagueness, ECAP 4, Lund, Sweden.

  152. May 08, 2002, A Valuational (but not Supervaluational) Approach to Vagueness, Working Group in the History and Philosophy of Logic, Mathematics, and Science, UC Berkeley.

  153. March 29, 2001, Frege’s Unofficial Arithmetic, Pacific Division APA Symposium, San Francisco, comments on Augustin Rayo.

  154. September 15, 2000, Topic-neutrality, Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science Colloquium, UC Berkeley.

  155. April 08, 2000, What is Modeled by Truth in All Models?, Pacific Division APA Colloquium, Albuquerque.

  156. February 15, 2000, Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism, Princeton University.

  157. February 11, 2000, Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism, New York University.

  158. February 03, 2000, Permutation Invariance and the Generality of Logic, Stanford University.

  159. January 31, 2000, Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism, University of California at Los Angeles.

  160. January 27, 2000, Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism, University of California at Berkeley.

  161. January 21, 2000, Aristotelian Matter Unified, University of California at Davis.

  162. January 18, 2000, Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism, University of Texas at Austin.

  163. January 06, 2000, Aristotelian Matter Unified, University of Michigan.

  164. May 14, 1999, Aristotle’s Argument for the Substantiality of Matter, University of New Mexico.

  165. May 08, 1999, Boghossian on the Analyticity of Logic, Central Division APA Colloquium, New Orleans.